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RESPONSE TO THE
A NTITR US T MARA THON
Antitrust (Over-?) Confidence
By Thomas A. Lambert* & Joshua D. Wright**

I. Introduction
On October 5, 2007, a group of antitrust scholars convened on
Chicago's Near North Side to discuss monopolization law.' In the
course of their freewheeling but fascinating conversation, a number
of broad themes emerged. Those themes can best be understood in
contrast to a body of antitrust scholarship that was born eight miles to
the south, at the University of Chicago. Most notably, the North Side
discussants demonstrate a hearty confidence in the antitrust enterprise
- a confidence that is not shared by Chicago School scholars, who
generally advocate a more modest antitrust. In particular, the North
Side discussants (for the most part) contemplate a "big" antitrust that
would place equal emphasis on Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and would expand private enforcement of Section 2. As scholars
who are more sympathetic to Chicago School views, we are
somewhat skeptical.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
** Scholar in Residence, Federal Trade Commission and Assistant Professor
of Law (on leave), George Mason University.
See Editor'sNote, 20 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 114, 114 (2008).

The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law and the Competition Law Forum of the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law sponsored "The Antitrust Marathon," a halfday roundtable discussion on monopolization law hosted by Loyola. The
"Marathon" will continue April 11, 2008 in London.
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II. A "Big" Antitrust
An overarching theme of the North Siders' discussion is that
the antitrust enterprise should be more ambitious. Thus, Professors
Stucke2 , Carstensen 3, Davidson 4, and Waller 5 and Judge Cudahy 6 all

invoke the historical context and legislative history of the Sherman
Act to support more aggressive use of the antitrust laws to combat
corporate power generally, regardless of its effect on consumer
welfare. Professors Waller 7 and Carstensen 8 push this intuition a step
further, contending that merely being a monopolist should render a
company subject to antitrust intervention, regardless of whether the
company engaged in conduct that could be deemed unreasonably
exclusionary.
Of course, to police the mere act of being a
monopolist, antitrust tribunals would have to impose structural, rather
than conduct, remedies. But that is not a problem for many of these
discussants.
At numerous points, the discussants express
an
9
optimistic view of structural remedies in monopolization cases.
The muscular antitrust the North Siders envision would also
expand antitrust's objective beyond combatinf allocative inefficiency
and thereby maximizing consumer welfare. 0 Professor Foer, for
Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable Discussion (pt. 1), 20
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 115, 135 (2008) [hereinafter Transcript part 1].
3 Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 137.
2

4 Transcript

part 1, supra note 2, at 141-42.

5Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable Discussion (pt. 2), 20
L. REv. 115, 159-60 (2008) [hereinafter Transcript part 2].
6 Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 166.

Loy. CONSUMER

7Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 159-60.
8 Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable Discussion (pt. 3), 20
Loy.

CONSUMER

L. REv. 115, 178-79 (2008) [Hereinafter Transcript part 3].

9 Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 137; Transcript part 3, supra note 8, at
178-80; Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable Discussion (pt. 4), 20
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 115, 201, 04, 07, 13-14, 16 (2008) [hereinafter Transcript
part 4]. In addition, Professors Foer (pp. 210-11) and Carstensen (pp. 213-14)
suggest that regulators and courts might reshape the structure of markets by forcing
dominant firms to subsidize incumbent or incipient rivals, and Professor Waller
argues for market restructuring via mandatory licensing (or access) under a
reinvigorated essential facilities doctrine (pp. 208).
10 Moreover, this muscular antitrust would readily "make examples" of bad
actors. Professor Carstensen, for example, recommends (tongue-in-cheek) that we
"[h]ang Bill Gates" and "lop off a hand or two" (pp. 136), because "the occasional
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example, suggests that a goal of antitrust should be macroeconomic
growth, which requires innovation and flourishes in markets
containing numerous competitors. (The upshot being that antitrust
should ensure the existence of substantial numbers of competitors). I I
Professor Waller would give antitrust a political objective; unchecked
corporate power, which he says is antitrust's chief concern, "is
corrosive in a variety of political and economic ways."' 12 Professor
Fiebig arhues that antitrust should account for externalities such as
pollution ; after all, a firm that can externalize its costs will have
unfair advantages over rivals that cannot do so. And Steve Shadowen
contends that antitrust's ultimate goals should be those that the
public, acting via juries, deem appropriate. 14 The common thread
running through these remarks is that antitrust should not be narrowly
focused on benefiting consumers by maximizing market output.
Chicago School thinkers - as well as many of those, such as
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp and Justice Stephen BreXyer, who
would align themselves with the "New Harvard" School - have
rejected these hallmarks of big antitrust.
With respect to the role of history, Chicago (and New
Harvard) theorists generally conclude that it should play little role in
the interpretation and implementation of the antitrust laws.16 The fact
is, scholars who have studied the Sherman Act's legislative history
have long disagreed on the enacting Congress's intent. 17 For most
execution of the monopolist may be good" for preserving salutary market dynamics
(pp. 137).

While these remarks were obviously hyperbolic (and presumably

assume that those made examples have been proven guilty), they call to mind
Robert Bork's observation about the bad old days, when antitrust was "in the good
old American tradition of the sheriff of a frontier town: he did not sift evidence,
distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but merely walked down main
street and every so often pistol-whipped a few people." ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 6 (1993).

" Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 156-57.
12Transcript

part 2, supra note 5, at 159.

13 Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 162.
14 Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 164.
15See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND

EXECUTION 38 (2005) (describing a new Harvard School of antitrust analysis).
16 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF

COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 48-56 (3d ed. 2005).
17 Professor Bork, for example, contends that the framers were concerned with
allocative efficiency as measured by neoclassical economics.

Robert Bork,
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Chicago and New Harvard theorists, history is irrelevant. The sparse,
vague statutory language that incorporates common law concepts
(e.g., "restraint of trade") amounts to a delegation of authority to the
courts to fashion a common law that is based on our evolving
understanding of competition and is focused on maximizing output.'
Chicago and New Harvard scholars also reject the notion that
merely being a monopolist should violate the antitrust laws and give
rise to a remedy. 19 First, monopoly profits - the prize for becoming a
monopolist - play a key role in economic development. Businesses
innovate in order to produce economic returns in excess of their
costs.
Such supracompetitive profits eventually attract other
competitors into the market, expanding output and driving down
price to competitive levels. As Professor Hovenkamp has explained,
"[t]he continual creation of monopoly, and its eventual correction by
competitive entry, is part of a never-ending process that explains
most of the technical achievements of modem industry in market
economies., 20 Thus, antitrust should not reflexively "shoot the
winner."
In addition, a rule that penalizes monopolists would be nearly
impossible to implement effectively. Presumably, such a rule would
exempt natural monopolists; otherwise, consumers would suffer
because economies of scale would be sacrificed. But to identify
natural monopolists, courts would have to determine whether
multiple firms operating in the market could attain minimum efficient
scale. This is extremely difficult for most economists and well
beyond the competence of common law courts. 21 Thus, any doctrine
of "no fault" monopolization would risk thwarting scale economies
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
Others say Congress was concerned with fair business behavior, regardless of
efficiency concerns. See Louis Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic
Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076 (1976). Some say Congress was
seeking to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to monopolistic or collusive
producers. See Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
65 (1982). Still others insist the Sherman Act was protectionist legislation intended
to benefit small businesses. See George Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An
Interest-GroupPerspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985).
18Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 52-56.
'9See id. at 275-76.
20

Id. at 275.

21

See id.
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and thereby sacrificing consumer welfare. Moreover, given that
merger pre-clearance laws already forbid mergers to monopoly, a no
fault monopolization doctrine would apply only to firms that had
developed by internal growth and would thus force courts to break up
companies lacking obvious "fault lines. 2 2
That brings us to the next characteristic of the North Sider's
big antitrust - the affinity for structural remedies. Chicagoans and
their New Harvard cousins do not share the North Siders' optimism
about such remedies. As a matter of fact (a fact some of the North
Siders acknowledge 23) most structural remedies that have been
attempted have failed miserably.24 That should not be surprising.
Structural remedies require courts or regulators to determine - far
from the action - how productive resources should be allocated so as
to minimize the costs of production (i.e., to maximize productive
efficiencies). They also must keep market power-induced allocative
inefficiencies at a minimum.2 5 Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek predicted
such centralized planning would fail because planners, absent price
signals, simply do not possess the time- and place-specific
information (and information-processing capacities) needed to

22

Id. at 276.

23

Transcript part 3, supra note 8, at 191-92; Transcript part 4, supra note 9, at

24

See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN

200.
(2007).
In his discussion of the structural remedy that broke up the Bell System,

THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE
25

Richard Epstein emphasizes this problem of limited information:
The chief vice of the decree was that Judge Greene was confident that
he knew the ideal structure of the industry-with the Regional Bell
Operating Systems taking monopoly positions in the local exchange
market, while competitive long line carriers facilitated calls between
the various RBOCs. But the administrative costs of running this
system proved astronomical, and [sic] did the distortions between
carriers that did, and did not, fall under the consent decree. ... No one
could have expected [Judge Greene] to understand the changes in
technology that rendered his decree obsolete. But, even if he could not
predict the direction of these developments, he should have been aware
of the pace at which these developments would take place.
Richard A. Epstein, StructuralRemedies in Section 2 Cases, remarks prepared for
joint hearings by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice and the Fed.
Trade Comm'n (Mar. 28, 2007) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
hearings/single firm/docs/222291 .htm.
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allocate resources effectively.26 The failure of Eastern Europe's
21
centrally planned economies seems to have proven him correct.
Finally, Chicagoans reject the idea that antitrust law should
pursue objectives other than ensuring competition so as to enhance
28
Macroeconomic growth, the avoidance of
consumer welfare.
political corruption, the elimination of externalities - these are all
worthy policies. The same might be said for certain forms of
redistribution and subsidization of favored businesses. But antitrust
law, the contours of which are shaped by unelected, non-expert
judges, and which largely is implemented by juries, is a remarkably
blunt tool for pursuing such policies. A wiser course would be to
limit antitrust to what it does well: protecting consumers from
reduced output and higher prices occasioned by collusion, mergers to
monopoly, and a few obviously anti-competitive unilateral practices.
Refined social engineering should be addressed through more
targeted legislation.
Thus, the Chicago School's antitrust modesty stands in sharp
contrast to what is perhaps the broadest theme of the North Siders'
discussion - the call for a big antitrust. Chicago (and perhaps New
Harvard) thinking would also diverge from two more focused themes
of the discussion.

III. Equal Emphasis on Sections 1 and 2 of The
Sherman Act
The first of these more focused themes is the suggestion that
antitrust enforcers have mistakenly allocated resources toward cartel
enforcement rather than monopolization under Section 2 of the
For example, Professor Waller observes that
Sherman Act.
monopolization enforcement in the United States has "become the
secondary stepchild to questions of conspiracy." 29 Professor Waller
goes on to argue that this less active state of monopolization
enforcement in the United States, at least relative to cartel
26

F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519

(1945).
27

See, e.g., ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A

123-41 (2007) (discussing how the failure of Eastern European
economies demonstrates the intractable difficulties of centralized planning).
NEW WORLD
28

See Bork, supra note 10, at 17-21.

29

Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 128.
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30
enforcement, is inappropriate "as a matter of history and policy."
Does monopolization enforcement suffer from an inadequate
allocation of resources relative to cartel enforcement? If it does, are
consumer outcomes helped or harmed by this state of affairs?
As a preliminary matter, it is not clear that modem
monopolization enforcement is especially inactive. Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Deborah Majoras has noted that one must go
back to 1971-76 to find a period in which the Federal Trade
31
Commission brought more cases involving dominant firm conduct.
Nonetheless, Professor Waller raises an interesting question: Why are
modem antitrust enforcement resources allocated so heavily toward
cartel enforcement rather than monopolization?
The discussants
appear uniformly to favor increased monopolization enforcement,
despite the difficulties associated with identifying anticompetitive
single-firm conduct and the related problem of false positives.
But the fear of false positives should be a primary concern
when considering whether to expand the use of Section 2. While
reasonable disagreement about the frequency of false positives and
the magnitude of their social costs might generate divergent views on
the appropriate scope of Section 2 enforcement, it should not be
controversial that Section 2 enforcement should be responsive to our
empirical knowledge of the competitive effects of single-firm
conduct. Surprisingly, the North Siders never explicitly acknowledge
that empirical evidence on single-firm conduct and its competitive
effects should inform Section 2 enforcement policy. The prominence
of empiricism at the heart of the Chicago School approach to antitrust
analysis contrasts sharply with the North Siders' relegation of
empiricism to little or no role.
So what would an empirically informed Section 2
enforcement program look like? It would likely begin with the
"error-cost framework," which recognizes that socially optimal
antitrust rules are those that minimize the expected social costs of
false acquittals, false convictions, and administration. One virtue of
the error-cost framework is that it allows antitrust rules to be
informed by our collective empirical knowledge of the competitive
effects of various practices. In addition, the error-cost framework
accounts for the fact that the social costs of false convictions in the
30 Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 129.
31 Deborah P. Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n., Maintaining our

Focus at the FTC: Recent Developments and Future Challenges in Protecting
Competition and Consumers, Keynote Address at the ABA Fall Forum (November
15, 2007), availableat http://ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/071115fall.pdf.
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antitrust context are likely to be significantly larger than the costs of
false acquittals. As Judge Frank Easterbrook observed, while judicial
errors that wrongly excuse an anticompetitive practice will eventually
be undone by competitive forces, judicial errors that wrongly
condemn a procompetitive practice are likely to have significant
social costs, as that practice is condemned across the entire economy
and the condemnation is not offset by market forces. 32 The error-cost
approach thus combines the existing empirical evidence on singlefirm conduct with Easterbrook's original insight regarding the
expected asymmetry of error costs to design antitrust rules. It forces
those advocating liability rules to take the reasonable step of
confronting the available empirical evidence in order to establish a
reasonable estimate of the likely effects of banning or permitting the
conduct at issue.
The error-cost framework explains a number of wellestablished antitrust doctrines. For example, the error-cost approach
justifies application of per se rules to naked horizontal price-fixing.
That conduct almost always has pernicious effects on consumers,
rendering it preferable to condemn the occasional example of benign
price-fixing in order to prevent socially harmful false acquittals.
Another obvious case of the application of the error-cost framework
is the law of predatory pricing. Here, the paradigm suggests that
socially optimal antitrust rules should be somewhat underdeterrent.
This is because both the theoretical and empirical literature on
predatory pricing strongly suggest that the vast majority of
discounting benefits consumers. This implies that the social costs
associated with false positives are significant. Further, the judicial
error rate is likely to be high. Courts likely will struggle to
distinguish potentially anticompetitive discounts from their
procompetitive counterparts. Finally, the costs of administering a
rule that attempts to seriously evaluate whether a set of prices is

32 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 2-3
(1984) (discussing incommensurate harms occasioned by false positives and false
negatives).
33 Application of the error-cost framework has been used by a number of
commentators to evaluate antitrust rules. See, e.g., David Evans & Jorge Padilla,
Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago

Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (2005); C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C.
Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999); Keith
N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic
Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001); Luke Froeb et al., Vertical Antitrust
Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005).
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predatory are high. Together, these observations suggest that
predatory pricing ought to be governed by substantive antitrust rules
that give defendants
significant pricing discretion without fear of
34
antitrust liability.
It is instructive to briefly examine the current state of the
empirical literature concerning vertical restraints and monopolization
in order to assess the implications of the error-cost framework for
Section 2. The empirical evidence, in combination with conventional
insights about the costs of false positives and administration costs,
strongly support the view that the discussants purport to challenge:
that antitrust enforcement resources should be invested heavily in
favor of cartel and merger enforcement relative to monopolization.
Two recent empirical surveys summarize the empirical
literature and come to very similar conclusions about the likely
competitive effects of various vertical contracts such as exclusive
dealing, tying, resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, and
loyalty discounts. Cooper et al., examine the competitive effects of
various vertical restraints and conclude that "vertical restraints are
likely to be benign or welfare-enhancing. 35 Lafontaine and Slade
reach a similar conclusion:
[T]he empirical evidence concerning the effects of vertical
restraints on consumer wellbeing is surprisingly consistent.
Specifically, it appears that when manufacturers choose to
impose such restraints, not only do they make themselves
better off, but they also typically allow consumers to
benefit from higher quality products and better service
provision.
In contrast when restraints and contract
limitations are imposed on manufacturers via government
intervention, often in response to dealer pressure due to
perceptions of uneven bargaining power between
manufacturers and dealers, the effect is typically to reduce
consumer welfare as prices increase and service levels fall.
The evidence supports the conclusion that in these markets,
manufacturers and consumer welfare are apt to be aligned,
Application of the error-cost approach is also consistent with Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), where the
34

Supreme Court abandoned the per se rule against minimum resale price
maintenance, which had become incoherent in the face of modem economic theory
and empirical evidence suggesting that the practice was rarely anticompetitive.
35James Cooper et al., Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy: What About
the Evidence?, 1 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 45 (2005).
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while interference in the market is accomplished at the
expense of consumers (and of course manufacturers).36
In sum, if one takes the approach that optimal antitrust policy
should economize both error and administration costs as well as
display some sensitivity to the empirical evidence concerning likely
competitive effects of a particular restraint, it should follow rather
plainly that resources should be allocated toward those areas where
enforcers can more confidently predict that intervention will help
rather than harm consumers.

IV. More Private Enforcement of Section 2
Another theme of the North Siders' discussion is that the
increased enforcement in the monopolization area ought to come not
only from the public antitrust enforcers, but from private plaintiffs in
particular. The discussants contend that private enforcement of
Section 2 is especially important both because the government has
not been particularly active in the monopolization area and because
private enforcement is necessary for general deterrence. 3 7 There are,
however, several reasons to doubt the virtues of private Section 2
enforcement.
First, as discussed above, it is not clear as an empirical matter
that public enforcers have been unwilling to bring monopolization
cases. Recent public monopolization cases include
such high profile
40
39
cases as Microsoft,38 Dentsply, and Rambus.
Second, error-cost analysis suggests that focusing
enforcement on cartel behavior and mergers to monopoly rather than
monopolization makes sense from a consumer perspective. It is more
likely in the cartel and merger context that the average enforcement
action can confidently be said to increase welfare when error and
administration costs are taken into account. The empirical case for

Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical
Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS, X (Paola Buccirossi ed., 2006).
37 Transcript part 4, supra note 9, at 199-200.
38 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in
part,253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
39 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.
2005)
40 In Re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 FTC LEXIS 60 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006).
36
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expansion of Section 2 enforcement, whether public or private, is
very weak.
Third, the possibility that treble damages and follow-on suits
from competitors would invite frivolous claims and deter efficient
practices and aggressive competition has been a troublesome aspect
of private enforcement. 4 1 A number of defenses can be made for
private enforcement of antitrust actions in general, but for several
reasons these defenses are especially vulnerable in the context of
As discussed, the argument that
monopolization enforcement.
relatively inactive monopolization enforcement justifies additional
private actions is weak because such an allocation of resources 4is2
consistent with public enforcement that economizes on social costs.
Further, the trebling of monopolization damages in private
enforcement actions generally is not justified on deterrence grounds.
While a damages multiplier may be justified to account for the slim
likelihood of detecting and successfully prosecuting clandestine
offenses such as conspiracy, most monopolistic practices are open
and notorious. Trebling in monopolization cases is not likely to serve
the purpose of general deterrence, but rather to deter efficient
practices, suggesting that single damages are most the appropriate
remedy in such cases.4 3

Fourth, one particular weakness of private enforcement in
Section 2 cases is that juries are especially ill-equipped to make the
types of complex determinations necessary to disentangle the issues
when monopolization is alleged. 4 A recent example of a private
monopolization action exemplifying these issues is Conwood Co. v.
United States Tobacco Co., where a jury deliberated for a total of
41

See, e.g., Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust

Laws: The CompetitorPlaintiff 90

MICH.

L. REv. 551, 563-67 (1991); William H.

Page, OptimalAntitrust Penaltiesand Competitors'Injury, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2151,

2162-65 (1990); William J. Baumol & Janusz Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1985); R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur,
The StrategicAbuse ofAntitrust Laws, 1 J. STRATEGIC MGMT. EDUC. 3 (2004).
42 Accord Hovenkamp, supra note (3 or 4), at 60, 108-111.
43 Id. at 66. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 272 (2d ed. 2001).

Dennis Carlton recently advocated a similar position.. Dennis Carlton, Antitrust
Modernization Committee Commissioner, Commision Final Report, Separate
Statement, 399-400 ("I favor a reduction in the multiple to single damages when
the actions are overt (e.g., exclusive dealing), and an increase in the multiple when
there are some parties affected by the act who are unable to sue (e.g., foreign
consumers in an international price fixing case").
" Id. at 61, 80.
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four hours before issuing the then-largest private antitrust verdict in
history. Despite evidence of tortious conduct from the defendant, the
evidence of actual consumer harm in the case almost was entirely
absent from the record.45
In sum, the case for expansion of private enforcement of
Section 2 is weak - considerably weaker than the case for expanding
private enforcement in other areas where actions are not overt or
there are adversely affected parties that are unable to sue. The
erroneous foundation of the argument that monopolization
enforcement should be as vigorous as cartel enforcement, as well as
the desired expansion of private enforcement under Section 2, both
originate from the view that the average public or private
monopolization enforcement action will increase consumer welfare.
The empirical evidence in the context of the error-cost framework
suggests otherwise. Similarly, as we have argued here, a quite
probable outcome of the expansion of private enforcement, in
particular, is the chilling of procompetitive conduct and reduced
consumer welfare.

V. Conclusion
Judge Harold Leventhal famously remarked that examining
legislative history is a bit like looking across a crowded room in
search of your friends - you are sure to find what you are looking
for. 46 No doubt the same can be said of transcript analysis. Given

that our task was to draft a critical analysis of the October 5
conversation, we saw much to criticize.
But much of the
conversation - the faces that did not immediately jump out at us,
since we were looking for matters to criticize - comports with our
own views, some of which are articulated here. In particular, a
number of discussants recognize the danger of false positives in

Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F. 3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
See also Joshua D. Wright, An Antitrust Analysis of Category Management:
Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 17 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. (forthcoming
2009), demonstrates that the defendant's conduct was not likely to harm
competition and does not justify liability under traditional Section 2 standards;
Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 180 (describing Conwood as "deeply troublesome
and offensive to antitrust policy").
46 Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
45

1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (recounting Judge
Leventhal's observation about legislative history).
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regulating unilateral conduct, 47 the chilling effect they can have, 48 the
tendency of monopolies to degenerate,4 9 and the need to craft
administrable rules for separating the pro-competitive wheat from the
anti-competitive chaff.50 Others emphasize the need for systematic
empirical inquiry into the efficacy of remedies - what works and
what does not work? 51 We applaud these insights and inquiries.
Most of all, we applaud this sort of discussion in general. As Judge
Easterbrook has observed, the "puzzle of exclusionary conduct" is a
tough one, for much procompetitive conduct literally excludes, and
efforts to stamp out the bad may unwittingly deter the good.
Conversations such as that which occurred in Chicago on October 5,
2007, and that which will occur in London in April 2008, surely help
as we endeavor to solve the puzzle.

Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 133-36.
48 Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 138-39; Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at
160-61.
49 Transcript part 2, supra note 5, at 161.
50 Transcript part 1, supra note 2, at 134-35, 139.
47

51 Transcript part 4, supra note 9, at 209-2 10.
Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345.
52
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